By Mahmud Tim Kargbo
Saturday, 26 April, 2025
When President Julius Maada Bio took the podium at the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) Retreat in Freetown to call for Africa’s enhanced representation on the United Nations Security Council, he was not just speaking on behalf of a continent but asserting Sierra Leone’s claim to diplomatic relevance on the global stage. His administration’s foreign policy strategy has consistently leaned toward multilateral diplomacy, international visibility, and symbolic leadership. Yet for a country mired in deep structural poverty and economic vulnerability, the more urgent question remains: are these diplomatic overtures serving the national interest as constitutionally required, or are they political theatre divorced from the daily lives of Sierra Leoneans?
The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone is unambiguous on the subject. Chapter II, Section 10(b) states that the foreign policy objectives of the state must focus on “the promotion and protection of the national interest.” In practical terms, this translates into foreign engagements that should drive economic development, improve public services, generate employment, and strengthen national institutions. Diplomacy must not only project Sierra Leone’s voice abroad—it must deliver measurable progress at home.
In practice, the outcomes have been far more symbolic than structural. President Bio’s international engagements have gained headlines and secured prestige, such as Sierra Leone’s presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2024 and its leadership on global reform discussions. However, a deeper audit of the administration’s foreign policy framework reveals a critical absence of strategic integration between international diplomacy and domestic development priorities. Unlike peer nations that have effectively translated diplomatic capital into socioeconomic dividends, Sierra Leone’s foreign policy lacks mechanisms for follow-through, policy coherence, or fiscal accountability.
Consider the case of Rwanda under President Paul Kagame, whose hosting of the World Economic Forum on Africa in 2016 catalysed foreign direct investment in tourism, ICT, and infrastructure. Ghana’s chairmanship of the UN Security Council in 2006 and again in 2022 was accompanied by targeted diaspora investment initiatives and industrial reforms. Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy leveraged foreign partnerships to fund infrastructure along its coastal regions while advancing its blue economy goals. In each case, diplomatic exposure was not an end in itself—it was a lever for domestic transformation.
Sierra Leone’s contrasting reality is marked by a troubling lack of such policy alignment. Despite high-level representation at global forums, there is no institutional framework to ensure that these engagements trigger concrete follow-ups—whether in the form of concessional loans, resource-based infrastructure deals, or technology transfer agreements. International diplomacy is routinely conducted in silos, disconnected from the country’s Medium-Term National Development Plan (2019–2023), and largely absent from coordinated strategies within the ministries responsible for finance, trade, and infrastructure. Diplomacy, in short, floats above the country’s development machinery rather than working within it.
The absence of developmental returns becomes even more striking when placed against the stark economic conditions within Sierra Leone. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2023 Human Development Index Report, over 59.2 percent of Sierra Leoneans live below the national poverty line. Youth unemployment stands at more than 70 percent, based on 2024 World Bank estimates. Access to quality education, health services, and sanitation remains acutely limited in both rural and urban centers. In this context, foreign policy must be more than aspirational—it must be materially transformative.
Yet evidence from fiscal reporting paints a picture of foreign policy as a cost center rather than a development driver. The 2023 Audit Service Sierra Leone (ASSL) Report revealed that Le14.8 billion—approximately USD 700,000—was spent by the Office of the President on international travel and per diem allowances without adequate documentation, oversight, or assessment of value for money. These expenditures occurred even as essential public services faced budget shortfalls. Rural school feeding programmes went unfunded. Basic medicines were not procured in a timely manner. Hospitals operated without essential supplies. In effect, symbolic diplomacy was prioritised over service delivery.
This contradiction raises profound questions about governance priorities. How can a state justify advocating for “historical justice” on global platforms while failing to fulfill its constitutional and ethical obligations to the majority of its population? If global diplomacy is to be legitimised in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans, it must first be localised in its impact.
Numerous opportunities for developmental diplomacy have been missed. Sierra Leone could have used its leadership within the C-10 and the UN to push for debt relief or restructuring, particularly under the G20 Common Framework—a lifeline for countries like Sierra Leone, where more than 50 percent of government revenue is spent on debt servicing, according to the International Monetary Fund’s 2024 Debt Sustainability Analysis. Foreign engagements could have been leveraged to secure infrastructure investments tied to natural resources such as bauxite, fisheries and marine wealth, which the World Bank estimates could generate $1.5 billion annually if sustainably harnessed. The administration could have pushed for a binding development compact—a new African Marshall Plan with enforceable commitments, modeled after the African Union’s Loss and Damage proposal at COP27.
Instead, the Bio administration’s diplomacy remains largely performative. There is no Development Diplomacy Directorate or equivalent institutional body tasked with integrating foreign policy objectives into domestic planning frameworks. Nor is there any formal mechanism to ensure that international agreements are monitored, implemented, or evaluated for developmental impact. Foreign visits are rarely followed by public reports or civil society oversight. The benefits of bilateral or multilateral meetings, if any, remain obscure to the very citizens whose interests those meetings are supposed to serve.
This absence of accountability is not simply a policy failure—it is a democratic failure. Sierra Leoneans have the right to know how their government’s international engagements are being conducted, what agreements are being made in their name, and how those agreements will improve their lives. At present, they are being denied that right.
There are clear and achievable reforms that could help close the gap between foreign diplomacy and domestic development. These include aligning all foreign engagements with national development goals; capping travel expenditures and redirecting resources to health, education, and job creation; enabling independent civil society and media to review international commitments; and using foreign platforms to negotiate trade concessions and technology transfers that benefit local industries. Moreover, global exposure should be leveraged not just for investment, but for institution-building—strengthening local accountability mechanisms, judicial independence, and electoral credibility.
President Bio’s pursuit of diplomatic prominence has placed Sierra Leone in rooms where few countries of its size have ventured. But presence is not progress. For foreign policy to be meaningful, it must translate from podium to policy, from visibility to viability, from global aspiration to national transformation. Until that happens, the chasm between what is said abroad and what is lived at home will only deepen, and the promise of diplomacy will remain unfulfilled for the people who need it most.
References:
Audit Service Sierra Leone (2023). Annual Audit Report on the Public Accounts of Sierra Leone. Available at: www.auditservice.gov.sl
Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone (1991). Chapter II, Section 10(b). Government of Sierra Leone.
United Nations Development Programme (2023). Human Development Index Report: Sierra Leone. Available at: www.undp.org
World Bank (2024). Sierra Leone Country Data Profile. Available at: www.worldbank.org
International Monetary Fund (2024). Debt Sustainability Analysis for Sierra Leone. Available at: www.imf.org
Government of Sierra Leone (2023). Medium-Term National Development Plan 2019–2023: Status Update. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development.
African Union (2023). Loss and Damage Negotiations: COP27 Briefing Paper. Available at: www.au.int
Rwanda Development Board (2017). Investment Impact Review: Post-2016 WEF Outcomes. Available at: www.rdb.rw
Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022). UNSC Chairmanship and Diaspora Strategy Briefing. Accra, Ghana.
BAPPENAS – Indonesia Ministry of National Development Planning (2021). Global Maritime Fulcrum: Policy and Economic Outcomes. Jakarta, Indonesia.
African Development Bank (2020). Natural Resource-Backed Financing in Africa: Lessons and Risks. Available at: www.afdb.org
